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Abstract 
This paper explores the requirements and determinants for the institutional viability 
of rural financial intermediaries in the developing countries. It identifies the constraints on 
viability resulting from a hostile environment, characterized by inflation, terms of trade and 
other relative price changes, and increased risks. It recommends survival measures for rural 
financial institutions engaged in a process of restructuring while facing this hostile environ-
ment. 
I 
RURAL BANKING IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: SURVIVAL MEASURES 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega 1 
I. Introduction 
There has been an increasing preoccupation among bankers, representatives of inter-
national agencies, and the financial authorities of the developing countries, as well as among 
academics and professionals concerned with economic development, regarding the perfor-
mance of agricultural development banks and other specialized rural financial institutions.2 
This concern has reflected a better understanding of the importance of the efficient pro-
vision of financial services for rapid, widespread, and sustainable rural development. It has 
reflected, in addition, frustration with the failure of traditional agricultural credit programs 
and with the obstinacy of the urban bias of financial development as well as concerns that 
an unstable macroeconomic environment and generalized distress in several financial 
systems will make the recovery and viability of many rural financial institutions even harder 
to achieve. 
1 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega is Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics at 
The Ohio State University. Previously, he was Dean of the Faculty of Economic Sciences 
at the University of Costa Rica. This paper was prepared for the Fifth SACRED Consulta-
tion, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Rome, April, 1991. Only the author is 
responsible for the views expressed here, which may or may not be shared by the sponsoring 
ins ti tu tions. 
2 An earlier concern with the performance of agricultural development banks was voiced 
by the Rural Financial Markets Program at the Ohio State University, as summarized by 
Compton Bourne and Douglas H. Graham in "Problems with Specialized Agricultural 
Lenders," in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J. D. Von Pischke, eds. Undermining 
Rural Development with Cheap Credit, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
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Many of these specialized rural financial institutions were created with the objective 
of supplying, either the longer-term credit that commercial banks were not prepared to 
grant, or the loans demanded by specific clientele, such as medium and small farmers, who 
lacked access to the financial services of the traditional banking sector, but who were 
considered to be a priority by the governments of the developing nations. Typically, 
however, these target clientele have been among the riskiest and costliest to supply with 
financial services. Mostly publicly-owned, the rural financial institutions have received the 
largest share of their funds from international agencies, governments, or central banks, and 
have granted their loans to beneficiaries who have not always possessed the requirements 
of creditworthiness, frequently at subsidized interest rates. 
Created with the best of intentions, in practice these rural financial institutions have 
found it difficult to target subsidized loans, postpone concerns about creditworthiness and 
risk management, and remain financially viable at the same time. As a result, many of them 
have required frequent new capitalizations and many are insolvent today. If they are to 
remain in operation and expand the scope of their activities, they will have to be restruc-
tured. Such an institutional transformation has become a difficult task in the hostile 
environment of the 1980s and 1990s. This paper explores requirements for institutional 
viability in rural financial markets, identifies constraints resulting from this hostile environ-
ment, and recommends survival measures for rural financial institutions of developing 
economies presently engaged in a process of restructuring, or planning to do so in the 
future, in order to achieve their viability. 
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II. Institutional Viability 
The main problem of these rural financial institutions has been their lack of viability. 
A viable financial institution is self-sustaining and valued by its clientele. This requires an 
agency that is able to cover its costs, that provides high quality services, that reaches an 
increasing number of customers, that is dynamic in providing new financial services and 
products, and that actively searches for ways of improving its efficiency, as reflected, in turn, 
by the level and the degree of dispersion of the transaction costs incurred by its depositors, 
its borrowers, and the intermediary itself. Viable institutions possess credibility and are able 
to mobilize deposits from the public, collect their loans, and retain good management and 
staff.3 
The lack of viability of many rural financial institutions has been reflected by the 
steady reduction of their relative importance within the financial sector of the developing 
countries, as most of them have not been able to increase and, in many instances, even to 
sustain the flow of their loanable funds, in real terms. On the contrary, their lending 
capacity has sharply decreased over time, because they have not protected their portfolios 
from inflation, they have not vigorously collected their loans, in order to be able to grant 
new credit, they have not aggressively mobilized local resources, in order to be able to 
widen the range of their services, and because, in view of the poor quality of their services 
and the high transaction costs that they impose, they have lost the support of their clientele. 
3 See Richard L. Meyer, "The Viability of Rural Financial Institutions and the System 
as a Whole," Report of the Fourth Technical Consultation on the Scheme of Agricultural 
Credit Development, Rome: FAO, 1988, pp. 41-44. 
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As their institutional weaknesses have become increasingly evident, these rural in-
termediaries have lost the support of the international agencies as well and, as a result, their 
loanable funds have further substantially declined. Ironically, their lack of viability has been, 
in large part, a consequence of their strong dependency on these outside funds, from in-
ternational donors, central banks, and governments. Given this strong financial dependency 
and a limited mobilization of deposits from the public, there has been a significant political 
intrusion in the agricultural development banks and other specialized rural lenders, in the 
sense that the decisions about who to lend to, what to lend for, and in what terms and 
conditions to lend have not been autonomously made by the financial intermediary, but have 
been imposed from the outside by the external sources of their funds. The criteria used 
have not necessarily been compatible with the viability of many rural financial institutions. 
Lacking viability, their survival has been questioned by many, including their own 
clientele. Increasing levels of loan default have evidenced this loss of the support of their 
customers. Loan delinquency has been a signal that the borrowers have not been interested 
in the survival of the institution. Since they have not anticipated it to be able to provide a 
permanent service, the expected value of their relationship with the intermediary has been 
low, and they have not protected it with the timely service of their loan obligations. 
Furthermore, where they have not mobilized voluntary deposits from the local community, 
these rural financial institutions have lost the potential support from a mass of depositors. 
Where available, the quality of the services provided to the depositors has determined the 
extent of their support and, thereby, the institution's ability to grow on the basis of locally 
mobilized resources. 
', 
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A greater reliance on deposit mobilization has been critical, however, at a time when 
severe fiscal constraints have reduced the ability of governments to capitalize these in-
stitutions with budgetary transfers, when the targets of macroeconomic stabilization pro-
grams have eliminated their access to central bank rediscounting and other domestic lines 
of credit, and when the international debt crisis has reduced their access to foreign savings. 
Some public agricultural development banks have retained, however, the support of 
local politicians, who still see them as mechanisms to favor some groups at the expense of 
others, namely, as instruments for political patronage. Their lack of viability has reflected, 
precisely, these high levels of political intrusion and the biasing of their objectives away from 
efficient financial intermediation and towards other political goals. Frequently, the manage-
ment autonomy of these institutions has been less important than these non-financial 
objectives. These institutions have been expected to promote the growth of agricultural 
production, regional development, the adoption of new technology and/ or agrarian reform. 
As long as available funds were apparently abundant, there was little concern with the sound 
growth of the financial institutions per se. They were utilized as instruments to promote 
other development objectives, even if these purposes created excessive costs and risks for 
the institutions. 
In order to survive, however, rural lending institutions must now emphasize their role 
as financial intermediaries. They must operate under the premise that the efficient provi-
sion of financial services is an important contribution to economic development per ~. 
Instead of attempting to promote the production of particular crops or the adoption of 
specific technological practices, they must recognize that the role of financial intermediation 
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is actually to improve efficiency via the reallocation of resources through the discipline of 
the market mechanism. This is particularly important in countries where the authorities are 
implementing a program of structural transformation that allows a greater role for prices 
and the allocation of resources according to comparative advantages. In such cases, what 
must be emphasized is the performance of these institutions as intermediaries between 
depositors and borrowers. 
The traditional credit programs, designed from a different perspective, mistrusted the 
market and minimized the role of interest rates as a tool for resource allocation. Those 
programs elected, instead, the administrative determination of who to lend to and what to 
lend for. Interest rate controls have been particularly ineffective, however. Savers have 
avoided bank deposits when the rates of interest paid have been repressed, while informal, 
non-regulated, parallel markets have flourished instead. 
Supervised credit programs have not trusted farmers, either, while insisting on rigidly 
targeting credit and on a detailed supervision of the use of the fund~. These efferts, despite 
their good intentions, have resulted in unexpected negative oon&equeooes. The fungibility 
of funds has frustrated attempts to control end uses. Rationing, in the pres.enc.e of ex.cess 
demands aeated by underpriced credit, and exces·sive Sl:lperviswn have b<Xh inQreased 
transaction cOSlts, -for the intermediaries as well as for the borrowers. Rigid credit program-
ming, .ldtlloagm 'Usua!Jily :fnlhle-ss, has thus heen expensive for all market p.articlpamts .:aad 
spe.ofa:11y fcr marginal customers with small loans. lnstitwtional 'viability 'Will requiir;e ilow.er 
·.GpeT.aiticmai oosts and 'better quality of service, while :greater economic ~fficiel:ley ·will r~lrlk 
ii:re>m mci>Te decentralized decisions about resource allocation. 
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What matters is the creation of creditworthiness; the existence of economic agents 
able to borrow, to pay market interest rates, to efficiently use funds, and pay loans back. 
Timely, untied, flexible loans and secure, low-cost depositing facilities would allow these 
creditworthy agents to improve their financial management and increase their productivity. 
What matters are financial intermediaries capable of identifying these creditworthy agents 
at a low cost and of servicing their varied demands for financial services as well as of timely 
collecting their loans. What are needed are viable institutions, capable of offering a wide 
range of financial services, to an ample and diversified rural clientele, independently of the 
end use of the funds. 
The traditional agricultural credit programs were characterized, in addition, by bor-
rower domination. Practices and operational procedures were designed with the interests 
of just the borrowers in mind. The rapid disbursement of the funds was favored, target 
clientele were chosen independently of their repayment capacity, and credit was subsidized. 
In a depositor-dominated institution, on the other hand, practices and procedures seek to 
protect the depositors' savings. The borrowers' repayment capacity is taken more seriously, 
efforts towards loan collection are emphasized, and portfolio diversification is used as a risk 
management tool, avoiding the concentration of the portfolio in a few crops or activities. 
Many rural financial institutions have been pessimistic about opportunities for the successful 
mobilization of local deposits, however. They have assumed that rural households do not 
save, do not want to transform some of their assets into deposits, and do not react to 
changes in interest rates and other economic incentives. 
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those tew htstittttit>rls that have emphasized saVings mtJbillzation have been more 
sueee§sftti, bOW~VE!t.4 they have discovered that there is a high demand fot depo1dt fa .. 
ciliii~s ill the rurai tieas of the developing countries and have suc"'essfully tapped these 
additiorta11oartable furtds. The depositors are the firtattcial ittstitutit>tt's best ally* indeed. 
Theit cnncetn for the safety of their deposits contributes to the ptutection of the intetmedia· 
ry's in~rests as welt. The key is to make deposit mobilization voluntary. The client must 
view depnsit facilities as a valuable service and not as an imposition or as a mere tool to 
increase the effecti\re cost of the loans. What matters is the quality of setvice to the dient. 
Qualify promotes client support. the healthiest way for ail intermediary to grow. 
Ilt Eyaluatig Finallclill lntetmtdlal)' Perromianc~ 
Several petf<>rtnance dtmemi-ons charatteri~ a viable financial intermediary. First) 
the viability {){ a system 'Of rural financial institutiom increases to the extent to which they 
provide acces$ M a wide range ef financial services for Widt s~gments of the popul~tion, in-
cluding loans fur different pull"O'Ses as well as deposit faciUtie:s, mttbanisms rot the transfer 
of funds and curre:m:y exthan'ges·, and other specialized 'Servi~ <0ttce ll'Nlrttt size grows 
sufficiently. In partl&i'ar, th·ere i'S a high ·demand fur d~sit facilhre:s in the rural :t'l'eas <of 
the 'dev~t<>j>'ing countries., g;."ven. household;.f.ann. requiremertts fut Hquidity ma!J!l.age~t ~oo 
rese'i've ;accu¥n\lllan0n. Whi'le oot aH producers need credit, all nf t~ ti~ ~.a~at;Jy ~H 
-ecomJ.Wic:agen'S \it~nEI tiqaidity maaagemetit f®ilities, 'SU'ch ·a1i ~'It ~mm!liies, ~ 
of the~. 
. 
4 Omtdto 'Gom~lez-Vega, '!$trengthen1ttg Agrioo1tura1 &nldrtg ~nd 10redit ~e'mS ~11 
Latin 1.America ;;md lt'he Caribbean," Rome: FAO, Agricu!w:ra1 Services nivision, :t986. 
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Second, the viability of rural financial institutions is strengthened to the extent to 
which they transfer growing volumes of purchasing power, from depositors with limited in-
vestment opportunities, to borrowers with better productive options. In effect, the contribu-
tion of financial intermediation to economic development consists of the transfer of 
resources, from less productive uses, to activities where they can be more profitably 
employed. In this way, deposits substitute for less attractive uses of the funds, while loans 
make better uses possible. The extent to which intermediation increases efficiency and, at 
the same time, the viability of rural financial institutions depends, in turn, on the amounts 
of purchasing power so transferred. What matters is the real value of the channelled funds; 
their command over resources. What matters is not how many million dollars of credit are 
granted, but how much seed, fertilizer, or heads of livestock can be purchased with those 
loans. 
The creation and conservation of purchasing power has both macroeconomic re-
quirements and intermediary-level implications. At the macroeconomic level, to create 
dollars is easy; they may be issued by the central bank. To create nominal credit is easy, 
as well. To create purchasing power, on the contrary, is very difficult. This requires that 
economic agents be capable and willing to save. In addition, they must be willing to place 
their savings with the financial institutions.5 
5 See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "The Ohio State University's Approach to Rural Financial 
Markets: A Concepts Paper," Columbus: The Ohio State University, Rural Financial 
Markets Program, 1986. 
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the putchasing power channelled tht()ugh the financial system increases only if 
ihcoffie grt>\Vs Md if ~cofiomk agents firtd incentives and opportunities to save and to 
tleposit Tu attritet the depositors is thus a netessary condition for the transfer of purchas-
ing power from surplus to deficit units. This poses a potential conflict, since the interest 
rates attraciive to dep<>sitors increase the cost of funds for the borrowers. 
Inftation erodes the purchasing power of both deposits and loan portfolios. To avoid 
this loss, depositors transfer their purchasing power to other assets that are better forms of 
holding wealth in an inflationary economy, because they :conserve value: real estate, 
invent'ories, precious metals. Similarly, to avoid the threat to their purchasing power from 
devaluation, dep'Ositors bUy foreign currencies or <>pen bank accounts abroad. The con-
seque~'s ·are a ~uction of Ute re.al va:lue of the deposits held in the domestk finmoi:a:l 
'system. am! 'of the tooal lending capacity. 
The main responsibility of a financial intermediary is, in tmirn, ~ ~ the iitlitegrity 
oi lits loanable lfunds. The intermediary keeps those fu11ds in C1!IS!t0dy., im 1the 111ame of de-
positors (or i:nterna!fiona:1 ·ageflcies) that ·entrusted tb0se ifu11ds, 'S0 !the tlendeJ' 10ml1d, iin 1t11rn, 
facl~itate 'the borrowets' productive activities. If the l~er •daes 'n<!Jt rprot.eot those funds, ,it 
·Wreaks its agte{;ntetit with the depositors, who 'expeet Jto :recttpe-ra'te the weatth •ma4le 
;av~ldble !to 16~1Wts. .ff this ;purchasing pdwer is not 'prmooted, :the :imemiedimy 'will .find iit 
'ihipos9RJJ.e ru, •dfftrr ~ban ··sel'Yices 'to -its 'borit0wef1i, ·when :•hey 1need :its -suppom . 
. tf o ~keep ~ate iintegrity. Of its 'loanalJle funds, 'the rirtt.(fttme(liUfo/ •must ,ft.\(Oid 'the cettosian 
'eausea !»y •irillation. · This ·will only be possible if the nttes 1df interest ·Charged .are ipasiti:ve 
;in teal :terms; '.that is, if they are higher than the inflation rate. 
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Since depositors look for protection from inflation, as well, the intermediary must pay 
a positive real rate of interest for the savings mobilized. The institution's interest rate 
policies must respond, therefore, to expected inflation rates. An intermediary that charges 
only 50 percent of nominal interest on its loans, with an inflation rate of 100 percent per 
year, will experience, on this account only, a reduction of the purchasing power of its 
portfolio to two-fifths of its original value in only three years. After such a reduction in the 
purchasing power of its portfolio, the rural financial institution will be in a position to offer 
the same credit service to only 40 percent of its original clientele. If it tried to service all 
of these clients, it could offer no more than 40 percent of the purchasing power originally 
transferred. One way or another, the quality of service would have deteriorated and the 
institution would lose the support of both its depositors and borrowers. 
Inflation forces the financial institution to revise its procedures. Accounting practices 
must be modified, in order to reflect the real value of assets and liabilities and to avoid 
decapitalization. The greater variability of prices that usually accompanies an inflationary 
process, frequently coupled with selective price controls, makes the evaluation of lending 
risks even more difficult. Portfolio management practices need to be revised to take 
inflation uncertainty into account. 
In order to keep the integrity of its loanable funds, an institution must avoid opera-
tional losses as well. This implies both a reduction of operating costs, avoiding waste and 
inefficiency, as well as sufficient revenues. Effectively earned (rather than simply accrued) 
interest is the main source of revenues for a financial intermediary. The rate of interest 
charged on the loans must cover expected inflation and the institution's operating costs, at 
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the same time that it makes it possible to build sufficient reserves against default losses and 
it offers an attrattive remuneration to the depositors. To achieve this balance is not an easy 
wk. In order to keep the integrity of its loanable funds, the institution must also collect 
its loans. An intermediary that each year loses 40 percent of its portfolio because of default 
will lose its c::apital as with an equivalent rate of inflation and its loanable funds will similarly 
disappear. 
Third, a rural financial institution will be viable to the extent to which it offers high-
quality services. A farmer is interested not only in sufficient purchasing power from the 
lcian; he also wants the funds to be timely disbursed, the loan procedure to be easy and 
flexible, the amortization schedule to adequately correspond to his cash flow, and the loan 
tettn to be sufficiently long. All of these features determine the quality of service. The 
farmer wants, in particular, access to a financial institution that offers timely, reliable, 
encompassing, and permanent servioos. 
It is not always easy to establish creditworthiness. For this purpose, what is most 
important is for the lender to acquire enough information :about the borrower, in order to 
be able to estimate the probability of lack of repayment. This information is accumulated 
through experience and a continued relationship with a particular client. Once his reputa-
tion ~ a good borrower has been established, the client protects it, since it is a valuable 
intangible asset. This asset is tttore valuable if the ttedit program is permanent rather than 
transitory. The bbtrowet also expects the program to be reliable; the expetted losses from 
tadc of a<:cess ~ credit when. this is needed, such as during an emergency, can be high. 
tJntimcl.y setvice and delays in disbursements cause additi·onal costs for the producer~ 
I 
• i 
' ' 
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The more complete the service, such as in a "financial supermarket," the greater the 
convenience and less the cost for the client. There are many advantages for the client from 
holding his deposits and conducting his credit transactions at the same institution. The 
client's first interest is, therefore, a viable institution, with which to develop a long-term 
relationship. This is, indeed, the nature of his implicit contract with the informal money-
lender. An intermediary that is not valued by its customers is not viable. 
Fourth, the viability of a rural financial institution is strengthened when it offers low-
cost services. This does not mean that interest rates must be kept at artificially low levels. 
What would be the value of too low an interest rate, if the loans are disbursed several 
months later, when they are not needed any longer, or if the expenditures that the farmer 
wants to make are not authorized? What would be the value of an artificially low interest 
rate, if it decapitalizes the intermediary to the point that it has to drastically reduce the 
amounts that it can lend? What would be the value of subsidized credit, if the farmer can 
get it this year, but not the next? 
Financial services are never cheap. The operation of the financial system is costly 
both for the intermediaries and their clientele. What matters, for production and investment 
decisions, is the total cost of the funds for the borrowers. Interest payments are only a 
portion of these costs, freqmmtly not the most important. There are other implicit costs, 
such as the opportunity cost of the time spent in the transaction or the losses due to delays 
in the disbursement of the funds. There are legal expenses, commissions, taxes, travel costs, 
and bribes. There are risks of losses of collateral. When these other costs are high, loans 
are expensive. 
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What matters for the behavior of savers is the net return on deposits, once taxes, 
travel expenses, and the cost of standing in line at a bank branch are subtracted from in-
terest earned. What matters for the intermediary is a financial margin that covers the costs 
of funds mobilization and the costs and risks of lending and that leaves a profit that allows 
for growth. A public or private financial intermediary that is not profitable, stagnates, and 
if it makes losses, it shrinks and it disappears. 
The main indicator of financial progress is a reduction in the transaction costs in-
curred by all, actual and potential, market participants. A reduction in these costs that, 
among other things, allows a shrinking of financial margins, is the most effective way to 
simultaneously favor both borrowers and depositors. If the intermediary operates with 
smaller margins, it will be in a position to offer a more attractive rate of interest to deposi-
tors, while at the same time it charges less to its borrowers. The ultimate challenge is this 
greater efficiency, that reduces the potential conflict between borrowers and depositors. 
Financial intermediaries contribute to economic development if, once all of these 
uses of real resources are taken into account, their operations imply low costs, for the 
clientele and for society as a whole. Too high costs imply a waste of resources, that could 
be more profitably employed in other activities: the farmer cultivating his farm, instead of 
traveling to the bank in order to find out what ever happened to his loan application; the 
depositor looking after his business, instead of waiting in line for hours at a branch; the 
redundant employee of a financial institution contributing with his efforts to another 
productive activity. Interest-rate ceilings cannot eliminate excessive costs. The search for 
financial viability will. 
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The limited success of specialized rural credit institutions has reduced enthusiasm in 
the search for an ideal type of financial intermediary. Rather, the purpose of policy should 
be the creation of markets, when these are absent or incomplete, the improvement of 
market performance, when this is not efficient, and the use of the power of financial 
markets to integrate other markets across the economy. 
Different institutional types possess comparative advantages to reach different 
clientele and to provide diverse classes of financial services. What matters, therefore, is the 
performance of the whole system, where numerous and diverse market participants are 
linked through flows of funds and of information. Thus, economic agents who borrow in 
one market, may lend in another, thereby reducing overall transaction costs and contributing 
to greater market integration. What matters is the identification of the optimum division 
of labor among several institutional classes. For this, the policies that guide their behavior 
are more important than differences in institutional type. Incorrect policies send wrong 
signals to all kinds of financial intermediaries, independently of their organizational 
structure. This is why a regulatory environment that promotes, rather than represses, com-
petition is critical. 
IV. Determinants of Viability 
The determinants of the viability of a rural financial institution may be classified into 
four classes: 
(a) the environment in which the institution operates; 
(b) the financial policies that regulate the institution's behavior; 
( c) the institution's organizational structure and procedures; and 
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( d) the financial technologies employed by the institution. 
The characteristics of the rural economy represent a major dimension of the difficult 
environment in which financial institutions operate.6 Potential depositors and borrowers 
are heterogeneous and geographically dispersed, their transactions are small, and the risks 
implicit in their productive activities are high, because the outcome of their efforts is highly 
dependent on exogenous forces. In addition, the physical and institutional infrastructure and 
the provision of public services are limited, input supplies are unreliable and marketing 
networks and systems are undeveloped, the levels of education and of human capital 
formation are low, information is scarce and costly, the size of most local markets is very 
small, and the institutional organization of the rural economy is incomplete. 
The consequences of this fragmentation, limited market integration, and incompjete 
institutional organiution are high transaction costs and high risks. Both reduce the demand 
for and the supply of rural financial services. In these ciraunstanoes., to become a viable 
financial intermediary is a very difficult task. Potentia1 depositors find that the net returns 
on their deposits are low and save in other, non-fmancial forms. Potenltiai borrowers find 
ing a multitude of. small savings accounts :and the costs and riskti of ev.aiJuating and admimr 
Tl'dtber deposit DOI" credit ·5el'Vices, except to a few blrge cliena.. 
~See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, 'On the Viability df Agricultural Dev.elopment Banks: 
Conceptual Fl11Jllework," and "Evaluating the Viability of Agricultural Development Banks; 
A Methodology;" papers prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank, AprH, 1990.. 
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Numerous elements of the physical, technological, and institutional environment 
determine the profitability and risks of agricultural activities and, as a result, the profitability 
and risks of loans to farmers. The growth potential of a rural financial intermediary 
depends to a large extent on the solvency and dynamism of its clientele. Farmers with low 
and unstable returns cannot become good clients. Low incomes limit their savings capacity 
and their ability to transform some of their assets into financial deposits. Low and variable 
incomes reduce their desire to borrow, limit their opportunities to profitably use loan funds, 
and diminish their ability and willingness to repay loans. 
Rural financial institutions will be more viable when farmer returns are high, rural 
incomes grow, and policies do not discriminate against farming. The development of the 
country's infrastructure, greater security in land tenure arrangements, and a legal framework 
that protects property rights and the enforcement of contracts increase resource productivity 
and reduce transaction costs and, in this way, promote the viability of rural financial 
institutions. 
Regulations regarding financial contracts, property rights, bankruptcy, and procedures 
to seize collateral in case of default are necessary for the viable operation of institutional 
intermediaries that cannot rely on collateral substitutes. Creditworthiness greatly increases 
when the rights of rural financial institutions in case of bankruptcy are adequately protected 
and when the borrowers can provide collateral. For this, it is important that property rights 
be adequately registered and easily transferable. Rights and responsibilities of depositors, 
borrowers, and intermediaries under financial contracts must be clearly spelled out and 
enforced. 
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One of the most important goals of the supervision of financial intermediaries in 
advanced economies is to ensure that portfolio assets do not become too concentrated in 
a single firm or subject to a common source of risk. This objective is very difficult to 
achieve in the rural financial institutions of developing countries, where all of the potential 
customers may be equally affected by shocks to commodity prices or crop conditions. These 
limited opportunities for portfolio diversification represent one of the major drawbacks of 
specialized rural financial institutions, whose clients may be engaged in the production of 
only a few goods, sold only in a limited number of markets. The problem is accentuated 
by the higher variance of returns displayed by agricultural production. Financial intermedi-
ary supervision is further complicated by inadequate supporting structures, such as lack of 
accounting standards. The lack of accounting standards makes it difficult not only to 
appraise and evaluate the creditworthiness of a potential client, but also to determine the 
quality of the intermediary's assets. 
In addition to the price policies, taJCes and subsidies that critically influence farmers' 
incomes, appropriate macroeconomic management and financial policies are crucial for the 
viability of rural financial institutions. A cautious macroeconomic management promotes 
stability and protects financial transactions from inflation and the overvaluation of the 
domestic currency. Austere fiscal policies reduce the crowding out of private-sector firms 
from the portfolios of the domestic financial system. Effective prudential supervision of 
financial intermediaries promotes their solvency and, thereby, the public's confidence. This 
trust is indispensable for firms and households to channel their savings through rural 
financial intermediaries. 
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Rigid financial policies have repressed the performance of rural financial institutions 
in many developing countries. Combined with inflation and devaluation expectations, 
interest-rate restrictions have resulted in negative net returns for depositors, in real terms, 
and have promoted dollarization and the contraction of regulated financial institutions, while 
a few privileged borrowers have received substantial implicit subsidies. High and differential 
reserve requirements have increased the margins between deposit and loan rates of interest 
and have further reduced the availability of loanable funds. They have been part of the 
complex mix of explicit and implicit taxes and subsidies that the fiscal authorities have 
imposed on the financial system and have created a significant scope for the collection of 
the inflation tax revenue directly from the financial institutions, which have been required 
to increase their holdings of non-earning reserves as the price level increased. Restrictions 
on portfolio selection have seldom matched the available loanable funds with the most 
productive investments. Instead, these funds have ended up financing government deficits 
or the capital-intensive projects of large protected firms. 
Interest-rate restrictions have forced many intermediaries to adopt non-price ration-
ing criteria that have penalized "difficult" clientele, including small farmers. When the 
lending institutions have not protected their portfolios in this way, they have rapidly become 
decapitalized. The viability of rural financial institutions requires, therefore, a policy and 
regulatory framework that gives them more freedom to determine the terms and conditions 
of their deposit and loan contracts, such as the setting of interest rates, and that avoids the 
targeting, selective credit controls, and other attempts at exogenously constraining the 
allocation of loanable funds. 
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In order to be viable, rural financial intermediaries need to become independent, 
permanent, and efficient institutions. Inconsistent objectives reduce their viability. Exces-
sive specialization increases their risks. Lack of deposit mobilization weakens their ability 
to take advantage of economies of scope. Institutional performance is determined largely 
by the behavior of managers, employees, and customers. The incentives and reward 
structure that guide the actions of these agents and sufficient accountability for the conse-
quences of their decisions are critical.7 Also important is enough authority to evaluate loan 
applications with independence and collect loans with energy. 
Political intrusion and other interferences with the institution's decision-making 
process, on the part of governments, international agencies, and domestic interest groups, 
may reduce the institution's viability as well. A much lesser reliance on external funds and 
a greater reliance on deposit mobilization would then contribute to a lower degree of 
outside interference with the bank's decisions. 
Risks are inherent in financial intermediation: loans may not be repaid, deposits may 
be withdrawn, interest and exchange rates may fluctuate, and the external environment 
(state of the economy) may change. The management of these risks requires technical and 
organizational skills, good judgement, and adequate internal controls. When management 
is weak, the intermediary will not be able to control these risks and is likely to make wrong 
decisions that lead to losses. Many rural financial institutions have lacked experienced staff, 
have adopted poorly designed procedures, or have attempted to expand too rapidly, losing 
control over their operations. 
7 Avishay Braverman and J. Luis Guash, "Rural Credit in Developing Countries," 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Working Paper WPS 219, 1989. 
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Rural financial institutions must have, in particular, accurate, timely, and reliable 
information to plan and to measure performance, in order to achieve and sustain growth in 
portfolios and earnings under variable conditions. Information helps to measure the 
inherent risks in lending as well as in funding loan portfolios and forms the basis for early 
and informed decision-making. The deterioration of many rural financial institutions in the 
hostile environment of the 1980s was significantly aggravated by the lack of timely and 
useful financial information available to their managers, that would have enabled them to 
take early, appropriate corrective actions, and to continuously monitor the impact of their 
decisions. 
The viability of rural financial institutions depends on the adoption of new financial 
technologies, needed to increase access to services for larger numbers of customers, to 
improve the quality of the services provided, and to reduce transactions costs both for the 
intermediary and for its customers. Instruments and procedures must be evaluated in order 
to determine the extent to which they could improve risk management. New mechanisms 
are indispensable to more efficiently collect, process, and take advantage of information for 
decision-making. 
Access to appropriate financial technologies is indispensable for the expansion of the 
supply of financial services when markets are being deregulated. Unless transaction costs 
are significantly reduced for all market participants, it will continue to be impossible to 
provide financial services to a wide rural clientele, despite ambitious policy reforms. Unless 
new financial technologies substantially reduce these costs, it may be impossible to improve 
the institutional viability of many rural financial intermediaries. 
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V. lntermediaey Viability in a Hostile Environment 
Many developing economies, particularly in Africa and Latin America, experienced 
severe economic problems during the 1980s, including the abrupt cessation of their access 
to foreign lending, much higher real rates of interest in both domestic and international 
financial markets, and a sharp decline in the international demand for, and the prices of, 
their export commodities, leading to a deterioration of their terms of trade and to much 
lower rates of economic growth. Most of these countries no longer possessed the foreign 
exchange to finance their excessive balance of payments deficits and were forced to devalue, 
in order to discourage imports and stimulate exports. Growing fiscal deficits fueled, in turn, 
accelerating domestic inflation, followed by the crowding out of private sector firms in 
domestic credit portfolios. It became even harder to sustain the viability of rural financial 
institutions in this hostile environment. 
Most alarming has been the acceleration of inflation. The average rate of inflation 
for the developing countries rose from 10 percent for the 1965-73 period, to 26 percent for 
1974-82, and to 51 percent during 1983-87.8 Inflation has been a result, in most of these 
countries, of too rapid a nominal expansion of domestic credit and, as a consequence, of 
money supply compared to the demand for the money. The accelerating growth of domestic 
credit has mostly reflected, in turn, the financing of growing public-sector budget deficits as 
well as substantial quasi-fiscal transfers to the private sector and a multiplicity of subsidies, 
including underpriced credit. 
8 Millard Long, "Financial Sector and Economic Development," Denmark: International 
Conference on Savings and Credit for Development, 1990. 
·. 
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By directly levying a tax on the public's holdings of the liabilities of the domestic 
financial svstem, inflation has been this sector's worst foe. When it has accelerated, it has 
quickly destroyed the financial system of many developing countries. Both inflation and the 
demand for the foreign exchange needed to service many developing countries' external 
debts have, in turn, exerted upward pressure on the exchange rate. The resulting devalu-
ation expectations have further jeopardized the performance of the domestic financial 
system, by increasing the relative attractiveness of holding foreign rather than domestic 
fim:ncial assets. 
Non-inflationary financing of the public sector deficits has presented problems of its 
own, frequently leading to the crowding out of private borrowers in domestic credit markets. 
High reserve requirements used to reduce inflationary pressures have caused wide spreads 
in the operations of financial intermediaries and have similarly reduced the supply of credit 
for the private sector. In insufficiently developed money and capital markets, large volumes 
of non-inflationary financing of public sector deficits have been directly reflected in very 
high real rates ot interc'>t, thus inducing the crowding out of the private sector through the 
co"it nf the func.b. 9 R11ral financial institutions have usually been crowded out, in turn, hy 
utl~ .. r publ;c sect1)f agencies ·with more senior claims and, when stabilization programs that 
ha-.t· ~harply rechced l1 udget deficib have been implemented, rural financial institutio11s 
ha' ; ios1 their p:-ivi!egui access to guvcrnment and central bank lines of credit. 
"See Alan lhe anl! Paul A. Popiel, .Managing Financial ili!ju~tment in Middle-Incon1~. 
C!>J!JJ.tci~'i. Wash•ngton D.C.: The \Vorld Bank, EDI Policy Seminar Report No. 11. 
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Recessions have reduced the incomes of rural producers, devaluations have increased 
the burden of debts denominated in foreign currencies, and higher real interest rates have 
made loans more difficult to service. The profitability of producer; of non-traded goods has 
declined with devaluations. As a consequence of fiscal austerity many subsidies to rural 
producers have been terminated. As a result, many borrowers have been unable and/or 
unwilling to service their loan obligations and the level of arrears in the financial system, 
including the rural financial institutions, has increased considerably, further dccapitalizing 
these intermediaries. 
Many of these financial institutions have rolled over loans that were non-performing, 
particularly in the case of the largest borrowers, hoping to avoid bankrupcy by keeping their 
clients in operation, and have thus constrained the flow of new loans for investment. ln 
order to restore their viability, these institutions need to stop the accrual of unpaid interest, 
must eliminate rollovers and the refinancing of non-performing loans, and should make 
appropriate provisions for bad debts. Those intermediaries that have no capital must be 
recapitalized, merged with more solid institutions, and/or closed, when they are no longer 
viable. 
There are several adverse consequences from the continued operation of seriously 
impaired rural financial institutions. This weakens rural financial markets and makes them 
more prone to crises. Further, the bailing out of institutions puts pressure on the authorities 
for support and subsidies, with additional fiscal costs, and for restrictive practices, that limit 
competition in the sector. Intermediation margins are widened and resource allocation is 
distorted in favor of non-performing borrowers at the expense of productive enterprises. 
·. 
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Moreover, the structural adjustment reforms undertaken in many developing coun-
tries do not immediately improve the environment for the rural financial institutions. A 
particularly difficult dilemma arises from the fact that many components of structural ad-
justment programs inevitably exacerbate financial distress, as they change relative prices and 
reduce the profitability of activities financed by these intermediaries before the policy 
changes were adopted, with long-term loans still in their portfolios. The reduced profit-
ability of these previously protected producers leads them to default on their loans. This 
is not a reason for holding back from these structural adjustment reforms, but potential 
problems must be recognized and anticipated. Moreover, structural adjustment programs 
may create new foreign exchange and interest rate risks for the rural financial institutions 
that they may not have experience in dealing with and introduce greater demands for 
management skills. 
The best way to deal with these problems is for the underlying growth of the 
economy to give individual producers and financial institutions enough leeway to restructure 
their activities. These requires appropriate macroeconomic policies. A difficult issue is how 
to distribute the inevitable losses from the crisis and the restructuring among the depositors, 
borrowers, institutions, and taxpayers. The protection of depositors seems important in 
terms of the futme potential for domestic resource mobilization. Financial intermediaries 
must write off debts that are clearly uncollectable and pursue those than are collectable 
aggressively. In the end, a critical component of the solution must be a reappraisal of the 
existing rural financial iastitutions and instruments, in view of building more robust systems 
and provide depositors and borrowers with far more options to suit their different demands. 
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As the world economic environment becomes increasingly suhje.ct to rapid and un-
predictable changes, it becomes critically important for rural financial in:-.titutions to absorb 
those changes with a minimum disturbance to their viability. Improved financial sector 
policies, institutions, and technologies are required. Several developing countries have 
attempted financial reforms to increase the role of market forces. in the determination of 
interest rates and other terms and conditions of financial contrach, the allocation of credit, 
and the overall scale of intermediation. 10 
These financial reforms have not always produced a successful transiuon to more 
efficient and market-oriented fimmcial systems. There b agreement, howe\'er, that in-
consistent macroeconomic policies have been the main reason for the eventual failure of 
some of these reforms. In particular, fiscal imbalances have to be reduced for the financial 
sector not to be repressed. Without retreating to the use of repri.:ssivc linancial measures 
as desirable instruments of policy, difficult questions about the best way to achieve financial 
liberalization remain unanswered.11 The promotion and management of rural financial 
institutions during a process of financial liberalization continues ro be ~· major challenge. 
10 See Michael P. Dooley and Donald J. Mathieson, "Financial Liberalization in Devel-
oping Countries," Finance and Development, September, 1987, pp. 31-34, as well as The 
World Bank, World Development Report. 1989, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
11 See Ronald I. McKinnon, "Macroeconomic Instability and Moral Hazard in B<tnking 
in a Liberalizing Economy," in Philip L. Brock, Michael B. Connolly, and Claudio Gonzalez-
Vega, eds. Latin American Debt and Adjustment, New York: Prneger, !989. 
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